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Abstract 
Land grabbing appears to be driven by a variety of factors that seem destined to expand in the long 
term. The aim of this paper is to highlight the behavior and the role of China (a net food importer 
country) and India (which is facing a problem of energy insecurity) in the current escalation of the 
commercialization of land and to identify (through a correlation matrix) the drivers of land grabbing 
deals. Our analyses are based on the Land Matrix Database. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since 2008, and following dramatic increases in prices, international commodities 
markets systems have been changing after decades of relative indifference. 
According to Engel’s law, food price trends have a major impact on the food 
security of the world’s poorest people (McMichael and Schneider, 2011; Nelson et 
al., 2010; FAO, 2009a; Headey and Fan, 2008, Zolin, 2012, Doeward, 2013). 
 
The reasons for high, volatile food prices are manifold and widely analyzed by the 
abundance of literature on the subject (Gilbert, 2010, Andreosso-O’Callaghan and 
Zolin, 2010a, FAO, 2009b, World Bank 2010a), that deals essentially with 
imbalances in demand and supply. On the demand side, a factor with a huge impact 
on the global demand for food, is the change in diet, especially in emerging 
countries where, an increase of per capita income corresponds to an increase in the 
demand for animal-based foods. Also on the demand side, the production of 
biofuels, aimed at compensating for the limited resources of non-renewable energy, 
has helped to push up the requests for energy resources production. In recent years, 
among the supply determinants in developing countries, such as low and stagnating 
productivity, weak rural and agricultural infrastructure and markets, trade 
restrictions, speculation based on food financial instruments and rising oil prices, 
land came to the fore because of its quantity scarce productive factor. 
 
As the demand for land increases, its limited supply pushes the price up, thus 
fueling speculation that mainly affects countries where land prices are lower. The 
African continent has seen a rapid increase in foreign investment in fertile and less 
expensive lands. Investments could be perceived positively, because of the 
introduction of technical innovations (World Bank, 2010b). The phenomenon of 
land grabbing, however, has few selected enthusiasts. As a result of the impact it 
has on local populations, it forces small farmers to compete with 
companies/organizations (public or private) with highly professional skills and 
plentiful financial resources putting the former at an extreme disadvantage. 
 
Our analysis of land grabbing, and its implications on food and/or energy security, 
focuses on China and India . China ranks first (or sometimes second) as the world’s 
largest consumer of agricultural products, mainly owing to its large population. 
China is also experiencing a shift in its eating patterns where the consumption of 
traditional staples (such as rice, wheat) is decreasing in favor of other products 
such as meat, fruit and processed food. India is an important consumer of 
agricultural commodities, also due to its large population; it is one of the world’s 
largest consumers of tea, sugar, wheat, rice, cotton and palm oil. From a general 
point of view, the economic rise of these countries is creating a growing demand 
for raw materials and commodities. It is predicted (FAO, 2009c) that demand for 
cereals will increase by 3 billion tons by 2050 (about 2,1 billion tons in 2009) and 
for other food products (livestock, dairy products, vegetable oils) the demand is 
expected to grow much faster than cereals mainly as a result of higher incomes in 
developing countries (such as China and India).  
 
The paper aims to highlight the behavior of China and India –which are among the 
most important emerging countries in terms of economic growth, concentration of 
population and surface area– with regard to the land grabbing phenomenon. We 
have aimed to identify those macroeconomic indicators (such as biofuels 
production, food price index, GDP per capita, cereals production and crude oil 
  
prices, usually referred in order to explain the trend) which best exemplify how 
they can affect the two countries analyzed in the rush for land.  
 
The paper is divided into sections. Following a brief presentation of the adopted 
methodology, an overall picture is presented of agriculture, renewable energy and 
land grabbing in China and India and, by means of a correlation matrix, the impact 
that some macroeconomic variables have on the phenomenon of land rush have 
been described. The findings and conclusions sum up our research. 
 
 
2. Material and Methods  
 
To our knowledge, the most reliable data sets available for the measurement of the 
phenomenon of land grabbing are GRAIN (www.grain.org), Matrix Land 
(International Land Coalition, 2012), FAOSTAT and the World Bank Data 
Catalog.  
The GRAIN data set, started in 2006, considers the food crops deals, involving 
large areas, signed by foreign investors (it does not consider the production of 
jatropha and cotton). The data set displayed, at the end of 2011, 416 deals 
involving 35 million hectares in 66 countries.  
The FAOSTAT database (FAOSTAT, 2013) collects data on agricultural land-use, 
including country area, land area, agricultural area, arable land and permanent 
crops and other descriptive measures of how the land is used. It does not, however, 
report records of land acquisition between countries. The same is true for the 
World Bank Data Catalog (World Bank, 2013). As reported in a recent review on 
the topic, “there is no consensus on the methodologies of identifying, counting, and 
quantifying land grabs” (Borras Jr. et al. 2013). 
The Land Matrix online public database was activated in 2000, when the value of 
the FAO real food price index was at its lowest level. Between 2000-2011, 924 
deals (both domestic and foreign investments) were signed, involving about 50 
million hectares. Records derive from a variety of sources (Land Matrix website, 
media reports, reports by international and local organisations and NGOS and 
field-based research projects, company websites and government records). In some 
parts of the world land grabbing partnership networks are strong, while in others 
they are very weak (as in Eastern Europe and Central Asia). There is a time lag 
between the deal taking place and its being recorded in the database. The initial 
dataset was revised in September 2011, thus, recent deals are poorly represented 
and in some cases incomplete. 
Taking into account all the critical issues and with a view to examining the 
phenomenon of land grabbing as a whole ( therefore also including domestic 
investments, in our analysis), we used the Matrix Land data set and Stata 12 
software to compute statistics. 
Domestic and foreign land investments are now investigated. International 
investments usually create more concerns and tend to attract the attention of 
researchers. National and foreign investments, generally, have different purposes, 
as do public and private operators. Internal investment strategies tend to respond to 
domestic public policies, while private companies (domestic or international) tend 
to focus on profit maximization, regardless of the nationality of the investor 
country. The negative impacts on the local population, if not compensated, tend to 
be larger than the positive ones; they also seem to be inversely proportional to the 
structure of local farms: the smaller they are, the greater the negative externalities 
from the acquisition (of any kind) of large portions of land. The paper, therefore, 
considers all deals regardless of the nationality or the legal status of the investor. 
  
 
In order to calculate correlations between the amount of land grabbing and the 
indexes (commodity food price index, world biodiesel production, world ethanol 
production, crude oil price, GDP per capita and cereals production), we used a 
pairwise correlation coefficient. We also applied Bonferroni and Sidak corrections 
to take into account multiple testing issues; p-values are calculated with a 
significance level α=0.05. Time series behaviours of the data were analyzed using 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions.  
 
The yearly commodity food price index, world biodiesel and ethanol production 
and crude oil petroleum price indexes were calculated as an average of the 
respective monthly indexes from the Indexmundi (www.indexmundi.com) 
database. The crude oil (petroleum) price is measured in US Dollars per barrel and 
it is calculated as a simple average of three spot prices: Dated Brent, West Texas 
Intermediate, and the Dubai Fateh. The Commodity Food Price Index (2005=100) 
includes the cereal, vegetable oils, meat, seafood, sugar, banana and orange price 
indices. World ethanol fuel production is measured in thousands of barrels per day, 
and it is intended solely for use as fuel. World biodiesel production is measured in 
thousands of barrels per day; biodiesel is derived from soybean, canola or other 
vegetable oils, animal fats and recycled grease. We used GDP per capita on a 
purchasing power parity basis divided by population as of 1 July for the same year 
(CIA World Factbook and Indexmundi). With regard to cereals production 
(measured in metric tons), we used the definition and the database of the World 
Bank (production data on cereals relate to crops harvested for dry grain only. 
Cereal crops harvested for hay or harvested green for food, feed, or silage and 
those used for grazing are excluded). 
 
 
3. Land rush: the role of China and India  
 
The current boom in the global commercialization of land has been defined in 
many ways, but the label ‘land grabbing’ appears to have gained a sort of official 
status when describing the phenomenon (Borras Jr., et al., 2011). One of the most 
concise and informative definitions of land grabbing can be found in a recent report 
by Daniel and Mittal (Daniel and Mittal, 2009); for these two authors, the grab 
“refers to the purchase or lease of vast areas of land by wealthier, food-insecure 
nations and private investors from mostly poor, developing countries with a view 
to producing crops for export”.  
 
This practice has gained momentum in the last ten years, especially after the so-
called world food price crisis in 2006-2008. In those years, average world prices 
for rice rose by 217%, wheat by 136%, corn by 125% and soybeans by 107% 
(Steinberg, 2008). This phenomenon was extensively analyzed by: international 
organizations (Anseeuw, et al., 2012; IFPRI, 2012; World Bank, 2010b; Cotula, et 
al., 2009), journalists (Pearce, 2012; Neuman, 2011; Blas, 2010), and academia, as 
well (Matondi, et al., 2011).  
In the majority of cases the purchase regards land water (Rulli and D’Odorico, 
2012), alternative energy (mainly crops for biofuel production, see Matondi, et al., 
2011) and labour (Li, 2011).  
 
This peculiar form of neo-colonialism is deeply influencing the food security 
policies of underdeveloped countries. To date, official reports by the World Bank 
(2010b) and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI, 2012), have 
  
described a ‘win-win’ scenario: land grabbing could be a pro, both for purchaser 
and seller alike. For the former, there should be an increase in food security, for the 
latter, an increase in knowledge about new agrarian technologies and in rural 
development. This analysis is fairly optimistic, and it has been criticised by many 
authors (see Borras Jr. and Franco, 2010). 
The main efforts in land grabbing analysis have taken place in Africa and South 
America. Over the last twenty years however, two of the biggest countries involved 
in land grabbing have been China and India (GRAIN, 2012; Baka, 2011).  
 
Economic growth is usually accompanied by improvements in the production and 
consumption of food and in the gradual reduction of food shortages. The 
phenomenon of urbanization that accompanies such paths affects consumption 
patterns by itself. Income growth generally changes the demand for food that 
moves from vegetables to animal proteins. The growth in demand for meat, 
however, has a more than proportional increase in the demand for cereals as feed 
for animals. These trends are reflected in the emerging countries including China 
and India. 
 
According to a recent research report (IGD, 2012), China has become the largest 
global food market, thanks to its population size, its economic growth and the 
consequent modification of the diet. The liberalization of the Chinese economy by 
Deng Xiaoping and the opening of the soybean market for animal feed in the late 
90s, deeply altered the balance between the domestic and the transnational agro-
business. In the last five years, China has been the biggest importer of oilseeds 
compared to the rest of the world. From a general point of view, imports are 
constantly rising as well as its domestic consumption of major protein meals. 
 
Because of the scarcity of arable land, China has always used labor-intensive 
methods; nevertheless it has periodically suffered from interludes of severe food 
shortages. Since 1978, Family Production Responsibility has created more power 
and autonomy to family businesses. As a result of the pressure of population size 
and limited arable land per household, land availability shrank (less than one 
hectare per household). A large share of the land is used for growing crops. Rice 
occupies the most significant portion, followed by corn and wheat. Among other 
important Chinese food crops are oil seeds. The livestock (swine) population is 
large. Indeed, according to FAOSTAT (2012), China’s agricultural production in 
2010 saw pork at the top of the list (in terms of value of production), followed by 
rice, vegetables, eggs, tomatoes, beef and chicken, wheat and apples (in line with 
the Chinese diet). China is the world’s leading producer of cotton. There is 
homogeneity in the production of commodities, at least as far as the first four top 
commodities are concerned; they maintained the same ranking between 2008 and 
2010.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1. Import and Export of Agricultural Products (Totals per year), China: 
1961-2010. Values in 1000 US $.  
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Source: Authors’ elaboration of FAOSTAT Database (FAOSTAT, 2013). 
 
According to FAOSTAT, China’s agricultural trade (imports and exports) showed 
a deficit over the last ten years. In 2010, China imported commodities for 
81,415,408 (1000 US $) with a 10 year growth of 530%. At the top of the list of 
agricultural products imported by China are soybeans (their value is more than 
fourfold that of the second highest ranked commodity), palm oil (raw materials that 
can be used for the production of renewable energy), cotton (China is the world’s 
largest importer), followed by other products classified as raw materials for the 
manufacturing or food industry. 
Chinese exports are mainly processed products. In the period under review, there 
were no significant changes in the top five products on the list, with the exception 
of garlic: high prices boosted its production in 2009 and 2010. Following the Green 
Revolution, India has been self-sufficient in food production since the mid 
seventies. Agriculture is an important sector with a workforce equal to about 50% 
of the total (including forestry and fisheries), with a percentage of GDP at 16.6% in 
2009 (CIA Factbook, 2008). In 2010 the agricultural trade surplus was almost US $ 
9.527 million.  
The agricultural structure consists mainly of small farms based on subsistence 
levels. In addition to these small family businesses, there are large, highly 
specialized companies, which are able to compete on international markets. 
 
The most important domestic productions are rice and milk (from buffalo and 
cows), followed by wheat, sugar and tropical fruits. Palm oil is the most imported 
product. If other oilseeds (soybean oil, sunflower oil) are included, it can be 
inferred that the requests for Indian agricultural commodities are essentially linked 
  
to the dependence of raw materials destined to the production of renewable 
energies. 
When ranking the most exported Indian products, rice occupied first place between 
2008-2009 and slipped to second place in 2010. Rice was followed by: cotton (with 
an upward trend), soybean cake, buffalo meat and tobacco. 
 
Figure 2. Import and Export of Agricultural Products (Totals per year), India: 
1961-2010. Values in 1000 US $.  
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Source: Authors’ elaboration of FAOSTAT Database (FAOSTAT, 2013). 
 
In 2009 a fall in exports corresponded to an increase in imports (palm oil). The 
drop in exports was mainly due to a fall-off in rice exports. In the period being 
considered, high rice prices led the Indian Government to adopt protectionist 
measures, due to a decline in exportable quantities. However, the balance has been 
positive since the start of the Green Revolution. 
 
Because of its surging economic activity, China has accelerated its energy demand. 
In India, energy supplies are also growing, albeit at a slower rate than in China. 
The main I energy source in India is coal, which is non-renewable and is poorly 
energy efficient.  As far as renewable energy is concerned, China is the third 
largest ethanol producer in the world. In 2002, it produced 76 million gallons; in 
2010 the figure was almost eight times higher (according to the Earth Policy 
Institute, it produced 555 million gallons that year). However, China does not 
figure among the five top producers of biodiesel (Licht, 2010).  India has a 
marginal role when considering the more important worldwide renewable energy 
producers 
  
Considering the land run as a positive aspect -agriculture needs investment to 
increase productivity- we analyzed the yield per hectare of China and India, 
comparing it with the Asian continent and world averages. The selected crops are 
cereals and oils.  
 
Figure 3. Cereals yields (Ql/Ha) time series for China, India, Asia and World.  
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Source: Authors’ elaboration on FAOSTAT Database (FAOSTAT, 2013). 
 
The trend of cereals was upward across the board, except in 2009, despite the high 
prices reached by cereals in 2008, which in theory should have resulted in an 
increase in productivity (according to the cobweb model, production plans are 
dictated by the prices prevailing at the time when decisions are made to produce). 
China yields per hectare were by far higher than the world and the Asian continent 
averages, while India reached much lower levels (about half those of China).  
Oil crops showed China at a disadvantage. The yields were slightly lower than the 
world ones, but far below the average of the Asian countries. India’s productivity 
was half that of China, and reduced, according to productivity indices during the 
beginning of the food crisis but production rebounded in 2010-2011. 
 
One possible reason for India’s low productivity may be the small size of 
individual farm holdings, but comparison with China is crucial. China’s farms are 
on average much smaller than those in India, but their agricultural productivity is 
higher. Both countries have a high concentration of the workforce employed in 
agriculture, uncultivated land is in short supply and the primary sector continues to 
be a strong contributor to the economy.    
The relationship between the land and its productivity generally obeys the law of 
diminishing returns . The fixed factor in agriculture is the land itself, and labor is 
assumed to be a variable factor. Output can be increased by raising the number of 
  
workers, however, if the number of workers continues to increase it will eventually 
produce proportionally less in relation to the original workforce. Small businesses 
tend to have an abundance of labor and the ability to work outside the agricultural 
sector is rather low. This implies that small firms tend to remunerate family labor 
with low wages, probably below the market wage. For small businesses, however, 
the cost of additional land is high and this prevents loss of labor by capital. This is 
not the case in China, where, according to Bosworth and Collins (2008), 
productivity growth is due to an increase in capital per worker and inputs applied to 
a Chinese agricultural worker are almost twice those of Indian ones. 
 
Figure 4. Oil crops yields (Ql/Ha) time series for China, India, Asia and World.  
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Source: Authors’ elaboration on FAOSTAT Database (FAOSTAT, 2013). 
 
 
With regard to India, the analysis of yields highlights the opportunity for a sizeable 
enhancement of productivity, both in the case of cereal grains and oil crops. In 
China, where intensive productivity methods were applied to the cultivation of 
cereals, the improvement in yields seems less likely. China, instead,  can still 
improve yields. 
According to the Land Matrix Database, the total amount of hectares involved in 
land grabbing between 2000 and 2011 totalled 48,829 thousand hectares, with 924 
deals in total. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 1. Land grabbing (in hectares) and percentages on world total. 
 
Target   
Cont inent  Hectares  % 
Investor  
Cont inent  Hectares  % 
Asia  23.105.941  47,3  Asia  27.080.206  61,4  
Afr ica  16.902.509  34,6  Europe    6 .778.319  15,4  
Amer ica    6 .557.461  13,4  Amer ica    5 .986.239  13,6  
Europe    1 .775.601  3,6  Afr ica    3 .429.339  7,8  
Oceania       487.681  1,0  Oceania       861.521  2,0  
Total  48.829.193  100 Total   44.135.624  100 
      
Target   
Countr ies  Hectares  
% (on 
world 
tota l)  
Investor  
countr ies  Hectares  
% (on 
world 
tota l)  
China  1 .108.396  2,3  China  1.547.324  3,5  
Ind ia  4 .616.760  9,5  Ind ia  6 .331.016  14,3  
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Land Matrix Database (International Land 
Coalition, 2012). 
 
The major targeted continents in terms of hectares are Asia (47.3% of the world 
amount), and Africa (34.6%). In terms of targeted regions in Eastern Africa, deals 
for 8,822 thousand hectares were made; in South-East Asia for 17,340 thousand 
hectares; in South America for 6,417 thousand hectares; in South Asia for 4,652 
thousand hectares; in Western Africa for 3,829 thousand hectares. South-East Asia 
and South Asia are the main targeted regions involved in land grabbing in terms of 
hectares. China and India - as targets - account for 2.3% and 9.5% respectively of 
world land grabbed.  
 
Among the top 10 investor regions South-East Asia, South-Asia and Eastern Asia 
are respectively in first, second and fourth place (in third place is the Middle East), 
with 18,599,295 Ha of investments (125 deals), 4,554,772 Ha (36 deals) and 
3,911,580 Ha (87 deals) respectively. The land grab of these regions is mainly 
directed towards inbound investments: over the 27.080.206 of total Asian land 
grab, only a 14% made deals with non-Asian regions.     
 
The main investors in terms of surface area are Asia (61.4% of total amount of 
world land grabbed), Europe (15.4%) and America (13.6%). In terms of hectares, 
the investors grabbed land for a total of 6,402 thousand hectares in South Asia; 
13,891 thousand hectares in South-East Asia; 2,799 thousand hectares in Eastern 
Asia; 1,544 thousand hectares in Western Europe; 1,888 thousand hectares in 
South America. Asia is still the main driver for land grabbing also from the point of 
view of investment (South Asia and South-East Asia are the two biggest investors). 
China invests 3.5% of world investments in land grabbing, while India invests 
14.3%. 
 
According to the Land Matrix Database, in terms of numbers of deals, the land 
grabbing phenomenon boomed between 2005 and 2009: the majority of deals were 
signed during this period (71.5% of the 235 deals recorded in the database). The 
  
number of deals in the last two years (2010 and 2011) was 26 (11.06% of the total 
number of deals that were recorded in the database for that year).  
As an investor, China made 43 deals between 2000 and 2009. The mean size of 
each deal was of 35,984 Ha (median: 7,000 Ha). India instead made a total of 120 
deals between 2001 and 2010. The mean size of each deal was of 52,758 hectares 
(median: 1,023 Ha). The mean size of each Land Matrix database deal was of 
52845 Ha (median: 9,742 Ha). Detailed statistics are reported in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of land deals (Ha) 
 
Area  Mean 
(Ha)  
Standard 
Error  o f 
Mean (Ha)  
Coeff ic ient  
of var ia t ion 
(sd/mean)  
Median 
(Ha)  
Interquar t i le  
Range (Ha)  
World  52,845  5,654 3.3  9 ,742 27,989  
China  35,984  17,472 3.2  7 ,000 8,800  
Ind ia  52,758  21,403 4.4  1 ,023 9,184  
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Land Matrix Database (International Land 
Coalition, 2012).  
 
China invested in East Asian lands (1,547 thousand hectares total land investments) 
specifically for agricultural purposes. Conversely, India invested only in South 
Asia (6,331 thousand hectares: total land investments) mainly for industrial 
purposes. The transactions are mainly in-country, i.e. China and India are investing 
in Chinese and Indian lands for most of their deals; India reinvests in Indian land 
for 69.6% of the total budget of its land grabbing commerce, China reinvests 
59.7% in Chinese lands.  
 
Outbound Chinese investments are mainly made by private actors, while inbound 
investments are public. The same is true for India: outbound investments are 
private, but the inbound ones are public. China and India dedicate the majority of 
their agriculture-cultivated lands to the production of jatropha (46.9% of total 
agriculture investments for China, and 70.9% for India). 
 
As targeted land, India has been involved in 4,617 thousand hectares of land 
grabbing deals; China instead made deals for a total of 1,108 thousand hectares, 
transactions are introverted since the only non-Asian investor is Finland (with a 
3.6% of the total of land investments). The main investor in China (except for 
China itself) is the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by just 
one deal for 100 thousand hectares. 
 
4. Findings 
 
We analyzed the correlation between energy and food indexes with Indian and 
Chinese land grabbing amounts (in hectares) per year. We plotted the cumulative 
percentage of land grabbing between 2000 and 2010 for China and India and we 
superimposed the trend of four main indexes. An interesting pattern emerged from 
the graphs: the more the indexes increased, the more the (cumulative percentage 
of) land grab increased. We plotted the time series of land grabbing and of the four 
aforementioned indexes for China and India in Figure 5 and 6 respectively. 
 
In order to analyze this correlation, we checked for time-series autocorrelations and 
partial autocorrelations, but none of them proved to be significant (at a 95% 
  
confidence level); therefore we did not correct for potential time-series 
autoregressive or moving average behaviours of the stochastic processes 
underlying our data. This lack of significance was most likely due to such a limited 
amount of points in the series.  
 
 
Figure 5. China land grabbing and indexes (world bio-diesel production, world 
ethanol production, crude oil price, commodity food price index. Years: 2000-
2010).   
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Figure 6. India land grabbing and indexes (world bio-diesel production, world 
ethanol production, crude oil price, commodity food price index. Years: 2000-
2010).   
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In China the phenomenon of land grabbing appeared in 2006 and reached a peak in 
2008. In India, the concentration of the deals, in terms of area, however, was 
observed in the period 2008-2010, in the midst of the economic crisis. The issue of 
the incompleteness of Land Matrix data, however, suggests caution in the reading 
and interpretation of the trend. 
In order to better estimate the magnitude of the connection between land grabbing 
and main food and energy indexes, a correlation matrix was calculated (Table 3). 
Positive and relatively high correlation was detected (around 75%) between world 
bio-diesel production, world ethanol production, the commodity food price index, 
oil prices, GDP per capita, cereals production and worldwide land grabbing (for the 
significant amounts see Table 3). There is also a relatively low (or negative) 
correlation between the six indexes and the quantity of Chinese land grabbing. The 
correlations for China land grabbing are not significant. Conversely for India the 
correlation values are quite high (around 50%) and positive. The correlations 
between world bio-diesel (71.1%) and ethanol (75.3%) production with India land 
grabbing are significant.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix
1
. 
  Worldwide  
land grabbing  
China  
land 
grabbing  
Ind ia  
land 
grabbing  
Energy World bio -
diesel  
production  
75.8* 
(0 .007)  
(0 .146)  
(0 .136)  
 
29.6  
(0 .377)  
(0 .999)  
(0 .999)  
71.7* 
(0 .020)  
(0 .412)  
(0 .340)  
 World e thanol  
production  
74.1* 
(0 .009)  
(0 .191)  
(0 .175)  
 
27.5  
(0 .196)  
(0 .999)  
(0 .999)  
75.3* 
(0 .012)  
(0 .252)  
(0 .224)  
 Crude  oil  
pr ice  
76.9* 
(0 .006)  
(0 .119)  
(0 .112)  
 
42.2  
(0 .196)  
(0 .999)  
(0 .999)  
43.0  
(0 .215)  
(0 .999)  
(0 .993)  
Food  Commodity 
food pr ice  
index  
74.5* 
        (0 .009)  
(0 .179)  
(0 .165)  
 
37.4  
(0 .258)  
(0 .999)  
(0 .999)  
56.1  
(0 .092)  
(0 .999)  
(0 .868)  
 GDP per  
capi ta  
70.7* 
(0 .015)  
(0 .313)  
(0 .271)  
 
-5 .1  
(0 .890)  
(0 .999)  
(0 .999)  
37.6  
(0 .319)  
(0 .999)  
(0 .999)  
 Cereals 
production  
82.8* 
(0 .002)  
(0 .034)  
(0 .034)  
33.4  
(0 .315)  
(0 .999)  
(0 .999)  
48.6  
(0 .155)  
(0 .999)  
(0 .970)  
 
1
 Land grabbing and indexes: total amount of land grabbing (in hectares) for world, 
China and India. For each cell we reported the correlation index, with the 
uncorrected, the Bonferroni’s and the Sidak’s corrections respective p-values. We 
starred statistically significant values. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Land Matrix Database (International Land 
Coalition, 2012).  
 
Finally, the main drivers of worldwide land grabbing are cereal production (food 
security), followed by the production of renewable energy and the price of oil 
(energy security), the prices of food and GDP (for changing diets). China has low 
correlation indices in the considered variables and a negative sign in the case of 
GDP. India, however, has significant correlation indices in the case of renewable 
energy, in support of the fact that the energy problem is still far from being 
resolved, even if this country has achieved food self-sufficiency. 
 
  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
According to updated official sources, the population of China and India in 2011 
represented 36.20% of the world population. According to The World Factbook, 
the total area of China equals 9,707 thousands km2 (UN, 2010) and 6.7% of total 
world land mass; the total area of India is 3,287 thousands km2 (US Library of 
Congress, 2004), 2.2% of total world land mass. China is a net food importing 
country, India, became self-sufficient in the mid-seventies, and is facing a problem 
of scarcity of energy sources and supply difficulties. Population growth, changes in 
consumption, fears over greenhouse gas emissions and the awareness of the 
scarcity of non-renewable energy resources, increased the pressure on food prices 
and their volatility, after years of relative stability. In countries where the 
availability of land has reached saturation level, other solutions were considered in 
order to increase production and ensure food self-sufficiency.  
In the land run, the Asian countries rank at the top of the investor and target 
countries and, among them, India and China share the highest positions. Unlike 
African countries, the percentage of the total domestic investment is very high in 
Asian countries. Chinese investments are concentrated mostly in China itself 
(59.7% of total land investments. Indian investments were mainly limited to India 
itself (69.6%). China invested in more than 1.5 million hectares in East Asian 
countries for agricultural purposes. Conversely, India invested mainly in South 
Asia (6.3 million hectares), essentially for industrial purposes.  
 
Our calculations have revealed the drivers who are affecting the phenomenon of 
land grabbing in the world, compared with China and India. The results are 
interesting worldwide. They confirm expectations and, at the same time, reveal 
deep differences between China and India and between those driving countries and 
the phenomenon as a whole. In China, the determinants appear to be related to the 
index of food prices and the price of crude oil. This is not surprising since China is 
a net importer of food. The scenario changes in India, where the phenomenon of 
land grabbing seems to be induced by the production of energy from renewable 
sources and is closely related to (lagged) prices of food and oil. During the global 
economic crisis the variables showed a similar trend. Land grabbing appears to be 
driven by a variety of factors that are destined to augment in the long run 
(population growth, changing food consumption and growing demand for energy). 
 
While Chinese and Indian outbound investments are largely underwritten by 
private actors, the inbound investments are public. These countries utilize most of 
their lands for the cultivation of jatropha (46.9% of the total agriculture 
investments for China and 70.9% for India). Jatropha oil can be used as bio-diesel 
for energy, as cake for fish or animal feed or for high-quality organic fertiliser and 
bio-pesticide production. Land grabbing, food security and energy security appear 
to be extremely closely related (Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Zolin 2010b). 
Therefore, the variables that affect the price of food and energy products also 
influence the extent of land acquisition. 
 
In the assessment of positivity or negativity of the phenomenon, relevant issues 
have to be considered. Is the land subjected to land grabbing fertile, marginal or 
unproductive? If the second case is true, can domestic investment in abandoned 
lands provide, at an aggregate level, an increase in production that may help 
achieve food security or energy security? Can they offer new job opportunities, 
facilitate the introduction of new technologies and improve the poor quality of life 
  
in rural areas? Regardless, the land rights of the local population should be insured. 
In India and China farms are extremely small and unable to compete with major 
investors (public and/or private). Among the three positions listed in the 
Transnational Institute’s Primer on The Global Land Grab (pages 21-23 of Franco 
et al., 2013) the first calls for regulation to facilitate investment (attributable to the 
World Bank), the second proposes the enforcement of new regulations to mitigate 
the negative impacts on the population and to maximize opportunities (FAO, civil 
society) and the third is based on regulation to abolish land grabbing (social 
movements and peasant groups). The authors support the second position.  
 
Additional research is needed. An initial approach should measure and analyze 
situations in different countries and the impact of land grabbing on the local 
population. Pinpointing these negative externalities would identify whether or not 
intervention was required and, subsequently which would be the appropriate tools 
for correcting and mitigating the impact on local populations. 
Other tools that already exist should be increased, for example, Oxfam Behind the 
Brands Initiative (http://www.behindthebrands.org/en/about) which, of the seven 
themes identified, includes: "land, Both rights and access to land and sustainable 
use of it" or the role that international organizations could play in raising awareness 
of world population, while waiting for assessments with a higher degree of detail. 
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